Property—Trusts and Future Interests—Charitable Trusts by Vaccaro, Anthony J.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 4 Number 1 Article 66 
10-1-1954 
Property—Trusts and Future Interests—Charitable Trusts 
Anthony J. Vaccaro 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony J. Vaccaro, Property—Trusts and Future Interests—Charitable Trusts, 4 Buff. L. Rev. 119 (1954). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol4/iss1/66 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
should pass as intestate property upon the termination of the two
measuring lives.
The Appellate Division modified the decision of the Surro-
gate, ruling that since the will made no provision for the payment
of the income during the lives of the grandson and grandnephew,
and since the income could not be accumulated (some of the residu-
ary legatees being adults) ,77 both of the latter measuring lives
should be excised and the corpus of the widow's trust should pass
to the residuary legatees at her death.
The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the decision of
the Surrogate. Finding that the testator had provided for a
delay in the distribution of the corpus of the widow's trust until
his grandson had reached twenty-one to assure an adequate prin-
cipal in the residuary trust to pay the annuity, the court ruled
that the trust was, therefore, an active one. The fact that the
secondary purpose of accumulating the excess income was illegal
could not destroy the validity of a trust having this valid primary
objective. The court further agreed with the determination of
the Surrogate that the gifts to the residuary legatees could not
be accelerated inasmuch as they were based on survivorship and,
therefore, contingent.7 8 The finding that the corpus of the widow's
trust-passed as intestate property necessarily followed.
Charitable Trusts
It is an established principle that where a testator has ap-
parently sought to leave money for a charitable purpose, a liberal
construction is to be given to the terms of the will in order to
uphold it and validate the bequest.79
In the case of In re Potter's Will,80 testator established a
trust for the benefit of the "education of the children of the
poor" and "for the education of the children of the poor who shall
be educated in the academy'in the village of Huntington." 81 The
academy was closed in 1858 and the building was torn down.
The question before the court was whether the testator had
a general charitable intent to educate the children of the poor, or
whether he had a specific charitable intent which failed when the
77. See PRsoNAL PROPERTY LAW § 16, REAL PROPERTY LAW § 61.
78. See Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1901).
79. Cf. In Re Pattberg's Will, 282 App. Div. 770, 123 N.Y. S. 2d 564 (2d Dep't
1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 835, 118 N.E. 2d 903 (1954) ; Matter of Neher's Will, 279 N.Y.
370, 18 N.E. 2d 625 (1939).
80. 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E. 2d 522 (1954); See Williams v. Williams, 8 N.Y.
525 (1853) where the same trust provision was before the court.
81. 281 App. Div. 981, 120 N.Y. S. 2d 636 (2d Dep't 1953).
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academy went out of existence. The Surrogate's Court and the
Appellate Division 82 held that the trust terminated when the
academy was closed. The Court of Appeals, (quoting the prin-
ciple stated in the first paragraph) reversed the lower courts
solely on the matter of construction saying that testator intended
that the trust be perpetually used for the education of the poor,
with the additional expression of a mere preference that they be
educated at the academy.83 They therefore concluded that the
trust survived the existence of the academy.
XI. ToRTs
Emergency Doctrine
In the determination of negligent conduct, the fact that the
actor is confronted with a sudden emergency, not caused by his
own tortious conduct, which requires instant decision is a factor
in an appraisal of the reasonable character of his choice of ac-
tion.1 The fact that the emergency is created by the actor's own
conduct does not prevent the rule from being applicable if his
conduct is not tortious.2
In Meyer v. Whisnant,3 the Court of Appeals upheld a dis-
missal of complaints against a host motorist as a matter of law
where it appeared that a "sudden, unanticipated, and unex-
plained" movement of a westbound auto into the path of the east-
bound host motorist's vehicle rendered him the helpless victim
of an emergency for which he was not responsible. The fact that
defendant motorist was guilty of a violation of the traffic law4
was insufficient to subject him to tort liability in the absence of
a showing of logical connection between the violation and the acci-
dent.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Conway, concurred in by Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Froessel, denied the availability of the
doctrine to defendant, and stated that plaintiffs had made out a
82. Throughout the long clause testator referred to children, and to the education
of children, on thirteen different occasions. The academy was mentioned five times.83. The court placed emphasis on the fact that children were mentioned thirteen
times and the academy only five times.
1. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 796.
2. Id. § 796, comment (a).
3. 307 N. Y. 369, 121 N.E. 2d 372 (1934).
4. VEHIcLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 81 (26). "The driver of a vehicle when upon a
highway outside of a business or residential area shall use the traffic lane at the extreme
right except when passing a vehicle, pedestrian, animal or substantial object in such
lane." In the instant case, defendant was driving in the left lane of two eastbound lanes
at the time of the accident.
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